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The use of argument diagrams to foster argumentation has been an object of research in
education, as a way to support students’ argumentative interaction and, potentially,
learning. In this paper it is shown how argument analysis and evaluation assisted by means
of argument diagramming tools, further developed in artiﬁcial intelligence (AI), can also
support the assessment of argumentation skills in the classroom. A case study is presented
to show how informal logic contributions on fallacies, in particular, can be combined with
the data of an argument-diagramming task, to form a method of assessing students’
weaknesses in reasoning about everyday issues using argument maps. Our contribution is
mainly methodological, as we suggest an application of AI and argumentation theories in
education.
ã 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Argument-mapping tools are designed to help a user visualize the premises and conclusions of arguments in a graph
structure, and display a sequence of connected arguments chained together to support an ultimate conclusion. More than
ﬁfty computational argument-mapping tools that can be used to assist an argument analyst are described by Scheuer, Loll,
Pinkwart, and McLaren (2010).
Empirical research has shown that argument mapping is a useful learning and teaching methodology, mainly because of
the importance of making reasoning explicit in different learning situations (Dwyer, Hogan, & Stewart, 2013; Maloney &
Simon, 2006; Scheuer, McLaren, Weinberger & Niebhur, 2014; van Amelsvoort, Andriessen, & Kanselaar, 2007). For instance,
argumentative interactions have an important place in collaborative learning, as students tend to make their arguments
explicit and to change their premises as a result of their peers when reasoning together to solve a problem (Asterhan &
Schwarz, 2009; Baker, 2009). But also in individual learning situations, either oral or written, students commonly use
theories and explanations supported by evidence when faced with complex cognitive subjects (e.g. Berland & Reiser, 2009;
Toth, Suthers, & Lesgold, 2002). More recently, computer-mediated argumentation in dyads or small groups of students
using some type of chatting platform has also been the focus of research (Andriessen, Erkens, van de Laak, Peters, & Coirier,
2003; Kuhn, Goh, Iordanou & Schaenﬁeld, 2008). In all these cases, teachers need to be able to assess student-generated
arguments, distinguish them from other reasoning elements, e.g. explanations, and suggest ways for their improvement.
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Although argument maps have been broadly used as a way to support students’ argumentation, through making their
premises explicit, no evidence exists yet on the function of such tools for assessment purposes.
This paper presents a way of assessing students’ argumentative reasoning through looking at their argument maps. To do
that, we combined the use of an online argument-mapping tool called Rationale with the application of the recent theory of
paraschemes (Walton, 2011a). The result of this “marriage” is a proposal of a thorough pedagogical assessment in the ﬁeld of
argument and education, as presented below.
This proposal may have a series of practical implications for educators at various levels, especially for the ones working
with adolescents and young adults. The reason lies on the function of active argumentative writing from part of the students
and the instructor-guided argument reconstruction that needs to take place for such writing to improve. The use of argument
structuring and visualization processes in educational argumentation contexts has been widely used, as described in the
next section. However, it is still unclear how the structured reconstruction of arguments by students using argument maps
can be of further use for reasoning assessment and improvement purposes.
2. State of the Art
2.1. Argument mapping tools and education
The use of argument diagramming tools in education is a way to represent students’ arguments in dyads, groups, or
individually. It is explained by the two-dimensional format of such diagrams in which students can visualize their reasoning
with boxes for premises and conclusions, and pro and con arrows for arguments. “This kind of representation is thought to
support argumentation because visualizing an argument stimulates users to include evidential relations, to keep a balance
between pro and contra arguments, to relate arguments and see inconsistencies and conﬂicts” (Munneke, Andriessen,
Kanselaar, & Kirschner, 2007, p. 1076–1077).
In practice, the issue of whether use of argument mapping tools helps either individual or collaborative learning is
controversial, as the ﬁndings of previous research are mixed. Some studies suggest that argument diagramming is helpful
while others ﬁnd little or no learning increment. One such experimental study (Pinkwart, Lynch, Ashley, & Aleven, 2008)
used LARGO, an information technology system for legal argumentation that helps students to build argument diagrams to
model the argumentation found in transcripts of US Supreme Court oral arguments. It was found that using Largo did not
lead to superior learning as compared to a text-based note-taking tool. However, it was also found that use of the system
could help lower-aptitude students. Other studies suggest a general connection between argument mapping and
enhancement of critical thinking skills (e.g. Twardy, 2004; van Gelder, 2005) without concrete evidence on how students’
arguments, argumentation dialogues, and learning outcomes are changed as a result of the mapping. Regarding the inﬂuence
of diagrams and maps on argumentative interactions, Suthers (2003) found no signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the depth of the
interaction, whereas Munneke et al. (2007) described the argumentative activity taking place as result of a diagramming
scaffold as “not really interactive” (p. 1086).
Nonetheless, argument maps have also been considered as useful scaffolds for critical thinking and writing. For instance,
Okada and Buckingham Shum (2008) showed that the structuring and modeling provided by an argument map is helpful for
science education, especially when it concerns evidence-based writing. Other researchers claim that the pedagogical
function of maps increases when combined with other scaffolds. Marttunen and Laurinen (2007), for example, have found
that secondary school students produce better argument maps by engaging in debate, as they become better acquainted with
the diversity of viewpoints about the topic at hand. Following a similar approach, Scheuer et al. (2014) combined argument
mapping with collaboration scripts that guide the student discussants through the process of analyzing and evaluating
opposing positions on a contentious topic to help all parties to the discussion move forward towards the goal of
collaboratively generating a well-reasoned conclusion.
All the above examples of use of argument mapping tools in education face the same challenge or lack: their use is limited
to an intervention or scaffolding level without any explicit connection to the assessment of the arguments produced from an
informal logic perspective. Most of the efforts provide a straightforward assessment of the students maps based on the
quantity of the boxes completed. New computational argumentation systems developed in artiﬁcial intelligence have gone
even further to support both argument evaluation and argument construction (Gordon, Prakken, & Walton, 2007; Gordon,
2010; Reed & Rowe, 2004; Reed, Walton, & Macagno, 2007). For example, the Carneades Argumentation System (CAS http://
carneades.github.com/), named after the Greek skeptical philosopher, can both evaluate given arguments and construct
(invent) new ones. A CAS argument graph is a bipartite, directed, labeled graph, consisting of statement nodes and argument
nodes connected by premise and conclusion edges. CAS is a formal argument structure where argument graphs are
evaluated, relative to audiences, to determine the acceptability of statements in a stage (Gordon, 2010). Conﬂicts between
pro and con arguments are resolved using proof standards, such as preponderance of the evidence and clear and convincing
evidence, inspired by the legal domain. CAS supports argument construction by generating new arguments automatically
from a knowledge base of rules and facts.
In general, educational research that includes argument maps focuses on the use of speciﬁc diagramming tools either
alone or in combination with other tools (e.g. scripts, chatting) as part of an intervention to enhance either arguments
themselves or learning of scientiﬁc concepts (following the generally known distinction between “arguing to learn” and
“learning to argue”). The recently proven value of argument maps as diagnostic methods of analysis and assessment has not
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yet been integrated in the educational ﬁeld. On the other hand, more and more educational researchers are interested in the
task of identifying and assessing ﬂaws or fallacies in students’ argumentative performance (e.g. Neuman, 2003; Osana &
Seymour, 2004; Weinstock, Neuman, & Glassner, 2006), without providing opportunities for reconstruction of the fallacious
reasoning. Some of the most common ﬂaws among adolescents and adults in terms of their argumentative reasoning are: the
lack of distinction between justiﬁcation and explanation (Brem & Rips, 2000), the lack of consideration of the other party
(Glassner & Schwarz, 2007), and the weakness to produce strong rebuttals, e.g. answers to counter-arguments (Kuhn et al.,
2008). Argument maps can give students and teachers the opportunity to localize and reconstruct argument ﬂaws, as they
provide a complete, two-sided argument structure, easy to understand and use. What is still missing is the method employed
by researchers and/or educators to assess the arguments produced as more or less ﬂawed and to provide the steps for their
reconstruction.
Our work endeavors to ﬁll in this gap by presenting a case study showing how to identify fallacies from the data produced
in a simple argument-mapping task. To do this, we implemented the recent theory of paraschemes, which is described in
detail below. In comparison to other theories of fallacies, the paraschemes approach is much more than a classical logical
evaluation of logically good or bad arguments. It gives an overview on how weak an argument is in a given context, pointing
out that the speaker has overlooked some crucial contextual aspects, such as relevant knowledge sources on which to base
his/her point of view, or core counter-arguments against his/her viewpoint. On this view, a crucial dimension of argument
assessment consists in determining whether the speaker has taken into account all the aspects and components of an
argument, without “overlooking” fundamental contextual premises. This approach to argument assessment and
reconstruction is crucial in higher education teaching and learning, as most one of the main reasons that prevents
adults from thinking thoroughly and consistently is the so-called intellectual laziness (Goodwin, 2010), which also lies
behind most heuristic thinking (Klaczynski, 2001). Implementing a method that deﬁnes arguments as having two sides, i.e.
the systematic one and the less critical (or more “context-overlooking”) one, is thus important for any educational context.
2.2. Paraschemes as a method for identifying fallacies
For the reasons explained above, the approach to fallacies in this paper depends on the concept of a parascheme, as deﬁned
in terms of the widely known concept of a heuristic (Walton, 2010, p. 160). According to dual-processor theories in cognitive
science, there are two systems that can be employed to arrive at a conclusion. In the rule-based, controlled and conscious
system of reasoning, careful calculations are used to arrive at a conclusion. The other system is based on heuristics, rapid
inferences that apply to situations that are familiar, enabling a fast decision to be made under conditions where there is
insufﬁcient time to plan carefully collect evidence (Gigerenzer, Todd, & The ABC Research Group, 1999). Heuristics are useful
in reaching a decision under constraints of lack of time and complete knowledge. As long as they are seen as tentative,
heuristics can be a good way of arriving at a tentative conclusion, subject to later correction as new evidence comes in. But
the problem is that we sometimes apply them inappropriately in place of collecting new evidence, or even refuse to reject a
conclusion arrived at on the basis of heuristics, even when new evidence has come in showing that the conclusion ought to
be questioned or even rejected.
In the account given by Walton (2010), the heuristic is a mediating concept between the notion of fallacy and the notion of
a defeasible argumentation scheme. If an arguer jumps too quickly to a conclusion, and later on fails to retract that
conclusion even if new evidence has come in makes the inference to it unwarranted. This situation is characteristic of many
instances of informal fallacies. For example the heuristic for argument from expert opinion can be concisely expressed as
follows:
if p is an expert opinion, p should be accepted (is likely to be true).
Obviously, this heuristic is comparable to the argumentation scheme for the argument from expert opinion, but it is only a
short “quick and dirty” reasoning version of it that overlooks other qualiﬁcations that may need to be applied for the scheme
to be valid. For example we may need to ask what ﬁeld the expert is supposed to be qualiﬁed in, or whether the expert has
evidence to back up his or her claim. On this approach, the fallacy of ad verecundiam, the incorrect use of argument from
expert opinion, is committed when the arguer uses this form of argument but overlooks critical questions, qualiﬁcations and
counterarguments that need to be taken into account. The complete form of an argument from expert opinion accompanied
by some critical questions to ask, in order to judge its completeness and validity, is described by the following scheme
(Walton, Reed, & Macagno, 2008, p. 310):
Major Premise: Source E is an expert in subject domain S containing proposition A.
Minor Premise: E asserts that proposition A is true (false).
Conclusion: A is true (false).
Expertise Question: How credible is E as an expert source?
Field Question: Is E an expert in the ﬁeld F that A is in?
Opinion Question: What did E assert that implies A?
Trustworthiness Question: Is E personally reliable as a source?
Consistency Question: Is A consistent with what other experts assert?
Backup Evidence Question: Is E’s assertion based on evidence?
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3. Method
The goal of this study is to show how an easy-to-use argument mapping tool, such as Rationale (van Gelder, 2007), in
combination with a recently developed informal logic method of identifying paraschemes can serve as a diagnostic tool of
heuristic reasoning emerged among students in higher education. On the one hand, paraschemes serve as a more realistic
way of assessing students’ arguments, based on criteria that are structured and context-related, and not on mere
classiﬁcations of “wrong” argument patterns. On the other hand, argument maps are essential for reconstructing the missing
premises, the contextual information, and thus provide answers to the critical questions. Through identifying and visualizing
what is wrong or missing in their reasoning, students have more chances to understand it and improve it. In addition, it is
important that teachers of all levels, especially in higher education, guide students in improving their informal logic skills in
concrete and understandable ways.
To better show off our methodological proposal, we opted for the case study method. According to Yin (1994), one of the
applications of the case study is also to describe the intervention itself. As explained above our data come from two different
samples, one in Europe (Spain) and another in Asia (Middle East). The goal of the study is not to multiply the ﬁndings by
cross-matching observations in the two samples. From this point of view, our study is a not a multiple case study. We do use,
however, the two ethnically different samples as two “contexts of use”, which is another way to increase the internal validity
of a case study design (Danziger, 1985). In the end, what we expect is some type of “naturalistic” generalization, as termed by
Stake (1995), in the sense that what we will hereby present in terms of design and method used can “resonate experientially
with a broad cross section of readers” (Tellis, 1997), in our case, educational researchers and practitioners.
3.1. Participants
In total, 205 University students participated in the study; of them, 112 were undergraduates at a University in Dubai,
United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.), whereas 93 were undergraduates at a University in Barcelona, Spain. The sample was mixed
regarding gender (58 males and 147 females) and discipline (Business and Education), and the average age was 19.5 years old.
3.2. Design
Participants were chosen according to classroom. In total, there were 5 Emirati classes and 3 Spanish classes. All of them
were taught materials for which argumentation was of great relevance but none of them had received formal instruction on
argumentative reasoning before. The procedure was the following for all participant classes: the same instructor gave a 45minute seminar on the basics of argumentation skills; after that, the students had 15–20 minutes to complete the argument
map presented in Fig. 1 as extracted from the Rationale tool interface.
The map consists of seven bubbles or map nodes: the beginning one or contention, which belongs to the initial claim,
three bubbles on the left where all reasons supporting the claim are to be written, and three bubbles on the right part, being
the counter-argument, i.e. what the other party would object, one reason supporting the objection, and a rebuttal that reestablishes the truth of the initial claim. Students were informed that all the steps of this mapped reasoning starting from the
left and ﬁnishing on the right are important and necessary. Regarding the initial claims or “topics” of their argumentation,

[(Fig._1)TD$IG]

Fig. 1. The Argument Map Task (extracted from Rationale Tool (van Gelder, 2007)).
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some ready examples of everyday reasoning were given to them. However, all participants could choose their own initial
contention if they wanted to. These were the three given topics to choose from:
1. Employees should not for any reason bring their pets to the workplace.
2. No person is allowed to stay at ofﬁce during the night.
3. We should apply a more environment-friendly policy.

3.3. Assessment
As deﬁned by the map task, there are six argument units to be assessed: one main reason for the claim, two supporting
reasons, one objection, one reason for the objection, and one rebuttal. In most instances, the contention or initial claim given
to the participants, so it did not form part of the assessment. What we are interested in is the skill to dialectically support a
statement without being in an actual dialogue. In this case, fallacies related to pragmatic conditions of a real dialogue do not
naturally emerge. For instance, we cannot produce an ad hominem argument when we argue alone. For similar reasons, the
skill to argue in individual tasks requires for the ability broadly deﬁned as antilogos, i.e. the ability to critically evaluate
whether speciﬁc information may support different claims (Glassner & Schwarz, 2007). The lack of manifestation of this
ability, which is shown to relate to predominance of heuristic thinking among adolescents and adults (Glassner & Schwarz,
Table 1
Main Informal Argumentation Schemes and their Corresponding Fallacies.
Argumentation scheme

Critical questions

From popularity: Nearly everyone accepts A, so presume that A is true or right.

Q1: Is it relevant for the speciﬁc context that people
believe or do A?
Q2: Are there enough reasons to believe or do A?
Q3: Are there any reasons not to believe or do A?

Corresponding fallacy: Ad populum

Gradualism: If you take step A, you will eventually fall into bad consequences.
Corresponding fallacy: Slippery slope

From consequences: If A is brought about, then good (or bad) consequences will occur.
Therefore, do (or do not) A.
Corresponding fallacy: Ad consequentiam

Q1: Is there a strong relation between A and its
consequences?
Q2: Is there enough evidence that A will eventually lead
to these consequences?
Q3: Is there a way that bad consequences can be
avoided?
Q1: same as above
Q2: same as above
Q3: Are there other reasons rather than A that can have
the same consequences?

From ignorance: All the true propositions of domain D in knowledge are contained in K. A is Q1: Is it true that all D are in K?
not in K. Therefore, A is false.
Corresponding fallacy: Ad ignorantiam
Q2: Is there enough evidence to believe that A is not in K?
Q3: Are there any other reasons for believing A without it
being part of K?
From expert opinion: An expert says that A is true in their domain of expertise. Therefore, A is Q1: Is E an expert in the ﬁeld F that A is in?
true.
Corresponding fallacy: Ad verecundiam
Q2: What did E assert that implies A?
Q3: Is E’s assertion based on evidence?
From correlation to cause: There is a correlation between A and B, therefore A causes B.
Corresponding fallacy: Post hoc

Q1: Is there a large enough number of instances in which
A correlates with B?
Q2: Do other variables other than A correlate with B?
Q3: Can B exist also without A?

From a group of cases to a generalization: Case 1 (C1) is considered representative of a group Q1: Is the generalization justiﬁed in terms of how known
of cases (G). C1 has a characteristic A. Therefore, all the cases of G are considered to have A. or representative C1 is?
Corresponding fallacy: Hasty generalization
Q2: Do the other cases that belong to G have additional
characteristics that do not imply A?
Q3: Can there be any exceptions to the rule that all cases
of G have A?
From analogy: One case (C1) is similar to another (C2). A is true in C1, therefore it is true in C2. Q1: Are C1 and C2 similar in respects cited?
Corresponding fallacy: False analogy
Q2: Is A true in C1?
Q3: Are there differences between C1 and C2 that
undermine the force of the similarity?
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2007; Klaczynski, 2001), leads to a list of reasoning ﬂaws, which call for their identiﬁcation and assessment. On the contrary,
a full consideration of critical questions-limitations, which reﬂect common ways of defeating a particular type of argument
(Nussbaum, 2011), leads to plausible argumentation schemes, some of which are presented on Table 1 (for a comprehensive
list of schemes see Walton et al., 2008). Each argumentation scheme provides reasons (premises) to believe a claim, but the
reasons can be weakened if one of the corresponding critical questions is not sufﬁciently answered by the analyst on the
basis of the argumentative reasoning data. In this case the valid argumentation scheme may become a parascheme, or a
corresponding fallacy, as shown in Table 1.
We herewith present the steps we followed during our analysis of the six argumentative units. At this point a clariﬁcation
needs to be made. Even though the physical dialectical partner is not present, we can still assume that intrapersonal
argumentative reasoning is divided into four levels: (1) the ﬁrst level of justiﬁcation, where reasons relate to their claims, (2)
the second level of justiﬁcation, where reasons relate to each other, (3) the ﬁrst level of counter-argumentation, where the
objection is judged against the claim, and (4) the second level of counter-argumentation, where the rebuttal is judged against
the objection and against the initial claim. We can also say that claims, reasons, and rebuttals “belong” to the proponent’s
side, whereas objections and reasons for objections ̈belong̈ to the opponent’s side. Having said that, here is the rationale of
our analysis divided into ﬁve steps. Each step applies to the analysis of each one of the six argumentative discourse units per
map.
Step one
The ﬁrst step is to identify arguments by looking for keywords that may relate to one argument scheme more than to
others. According to Walton (2011b), each scheme is associated with a set of identiﬁers keywords and markers. Table 2
presents the main argumentation schemes discussed in Table 1 with some examples of relevant keywords for each.
Step two
Once the argumentation scheme is identiﬁed, the second step it to ask the three main critical questions that apply for each
scheme. Sometimes, the answers to the critical questions can be found in further steps of the person’s reasoning, such as in
the objection or the rebuttal. See, for example, the following instance of a possible ad verecundiam fallacy:
Claim: We shouldn’t have cats as pets at home.
Reason 1: Doctors say they create problems for women.
Reason 2: Many women had cats and when they got married they couldn’t give birth.
Reason 3: Cats can introduce diseases to a woman’s skin.
Objection: Doctors sometimes say something without proving it.
This objection can be reconﬁgured as a critical question matching the scheme for argument from expert opinion, and
another critical question matching this scheme can also be considered. How objections can arise in such a case, and how they
relate to argumentation schemes and critical questions can be illustrated using the argument diagram shown in Fig. 2. The
explicit premises are shown as rectangular text boxes. The arguments are shown as rounded nodes that contain some
information about the argument. For example, at the top right, the statement that cats can introduce disease to a woman’s
skin is shown as a premise in argument a2 supporting the ultimate conclusion. The plus sign before a2 in the node tells us
that this is a pro argument. A pro argument is one supporting its conclusion, while a con argument is one attacking the
statement or argument is directed against. Notice also that one of the arguments is labeled as a pro argument from expert
opinion, indicated by the notation ex in the node. The explicit premise of this argument is the statement that doctors say cats
create problems for women. But in order to make this argument ﬁt the argumentation scheme for argument from expert
opinion and implicit premise has to be inserted, namely the statement that doctors are experts in such matters. And implicit
premise is indicated by the dashed borderline of the rectangle of the text box.
Note that in the argument labeled a1, both of the premises are implicit, and these two implicit premises in the linked
argument a1 ﬁt the argumentation scheme for defeasible modus ponens. In many instances, when unlinked argument
cannot be found to ﬁt any other scheme, it can be ﬁtted to the defeasible modus ponens form, often by adding an implicit
conditional premise.
Table 2
Main Keywords that Help to Identify Argumentation Schemes.
Argumentation scheme

Related keywords

From popularity
Gradualism
From consequence
From ignorance
From expert opinion
From correlation to cause
From generalization

(Many/most) people think/prefer/believe/do that
Something will/would be worse than before
Something will bring beneﬁts or bad consequences
I do not know any . . . /to my knowledge there is no . . .
Experts/Doctors/scientists/Mr. (surname)/Ms. (surname) say/claim/have found that
Something is happening or will happen due to its relation to a previous state
One person/case/myself does/is like that
OR All people/cases are like that
Same as above (the ﬁrst case), but with the intention to provide an example that is offered as basis for comparison

From analogy
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Fig. 2. An Argument Diagram for the Cats Example.

The critical questions are shown in Fig. 2 in rectangular text boxes with rounded corners and dashed lines. What has been
done here is to adopt the method of treating the critical questions as con arguments. Notice that the one critical question is
treated differently from the other. The critical question shown as con argument a5 asks the arguer to provide the names of
some doctors who have said that cats create problems for women. This critical question is shown as a con argument that
attacks the one premise of the argument from expert opinion, namely the statement that doctors say that cats create
problems for women. The other critical question matching the scheme for the argument from expert opinion, shown as
argument a3, is modeled as an undercutter, meaning that it attacks the inferential link of the argument from expert opinion.
Unless the arguer supporting the ultimate claim can give some evidence of this kind, the argument from expert opinion will
fail.
The ﬁrst reason given to support the main claim is not sufﬁcient by its own: doctors say that cats create problems for
women. However, critical question 2 regarding the speciﬁc aspects of the expert opinion is sufﬁciently replied through
reasons 2 and 3. Then, we have Q1 regarding the credibility of the doctor and Q3 regarding concrete evidence. These
questions are not sufﬁciently replied to in the ﬁrst part of argumentation when the participant supports her own opinion.
Nonetheless, when we move to the second part of the map when one counter-argues against herself, we see that the
objection is completely relevant to the lack of evidence and credibility concerning the statement that doctors sometimes say
something without proving. This statement implies that the arguer has awareness of the argumentative quality and he
knows exactly what to put under doubt. For this reason, we consider the above argument as an instance of the scheme of
argument from expert opinion rather than a parascheme that gives rise to an ad verecundiam fallacy.

Table 3
Criteria to Distinguish between the Ad Populum and the Hasty Generalization Schemes.
Scheme

From popularity or ad populum

Criteria

Reference to people is used to give credibility to a situation.
It usually refers to people’s beliefs, tendencies, or pReferences.
It is a vague reference to the crowd.

Scheme

From (hasty) generalization

Criteria

It is often used to compare one situation to another and give more credibility to one of them.
It usually refers to people’s actions.
It refers to a known number of people/cases.
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Step three
Sometimes we do not have enough information to immediately classify an argument as ﬁtting one type of argument
scheme/parascheme or another. In this case, some additional critical questions need to be asked. Here is an example of an
argument that was problematic to classify:
Claim: Employees should not for any reason bring their pets to the workplace.
Objection: They will create a nice environment.
Reason: Many people like pets.
In the example above, the possible fallacy appears within the reason that is given to support an objection. In this case no
additional reasons or further support are given, thus critical questions cannot be answered sufﬁciently. For this reason, it can
be assumed that the above scheme corresponds to a fallacy. Among the fallacies presented on Table 2, two are most
appropriate to be the case here: ad populum or hasty generalization. Table 3 shows a way of how to distinguish between the
two possibilities based on criteria that better correspond to one scheme than to another.
In our example, there is no intention of comparison of a situation that is more generally acceptable than another, as it
would be in the case of generalization. Also the statement “Many people like pets” expresses a general preference not
attributed to a concrete number of cases. Thus, it is more suitable to classify the argument as an ad populum fallacy rather
than as a hasty generalization.
Another example of distinction is the one between an argument from an expert opinion and an argument from an
established rule (Walton et al., 2008), especially in the cases when the established rule is presented as imposed by an
authority to which no one can object. The following instance is an argumentation example produced by an Emirati female
participant:
Claim: University female students should not get married while studying.
Reason 1: Marriage is a responsibility that requires time and priorities therefore they will fail in each course.
Reason 2: A human being cannot multi-task properly therefore they will fail in either education or marriage.
Reason 3: A University student can wait to get married for a better academic performance.
Objection: Our community sets rules that it is very OK to get married at that age and you cannot say no to that.
Reason: The University can manage to have a light schedule for married women.
Rebuttal: UAE community is growing and changing their age of marriage.
The argument from established opinion lies in the objection that the local community sets rules according to which
marriage at an early age is not only allowed but also desired. The institution behind the rule establishment, in this case the
“community,” is very similar to an authority whose word should be respected regardless what. However, an argument from
expert opinion would start by something like “Experts say”, “Doctors say”, or “Mr./Ms. X says.” Here is an example:
Claim: Employees should not for any reason bring their pets at work.
Reason 1: It is non-hygienic.
Reason 2: Experts say that they provoke distraction and reduction in performance.
Reason 3: They make noise.
This argument fails to give a satisfying answer to all three corresponding critical questions, as they appear on Table 1. First
of all, the word “experts” is very general and does not reveal anything of the type of expert or ﬁeld of study. No expert is even
named. Secondly, the experts’ statement on distraction and performance reduction is again general and poorly justiﬁed by
the simple observation that pets make noise. Last but not least, no concrete evidence is provided. For all these reasons, the
argument is considered a parascheme or ad verecundiam fallacy. To distinguish this (para) scheme from the (para) scheme of
an argument from an established rule, the following three additional critical questions should be asked: (1) Is the statement
made by an expert or by a general body, institution, or commonly accepted view? (2) Does the statement refer to a rule about
how things should be or to a body of knowledge and/or experience? (3) Does the extra evidence concern the credibility of the
source or the general acceptance of the statement? Table 4 presents the distinctive criteria between an argument from
expert opinion and an argument from established rule:

Table 4
Criteria to Distinguish between the Argument from Expert Opinion and From Established Rule.
Scheme

From expert opinion/ad verecundiam

Criteria

The source is an expert, either a speciﬁc person or a body of experts in a particular ﬁeld.
The statement refers to a particular piece or body of knowledge.
Evidence is given to support the credibility of the expert and her statement.

Scheme

From established rule

Criteria

The source is vague, a group of people, e.g. a community, institution, and sometimes the society as a whole who have established a speciﬁc
prescription.
The statement refers to a generalized view on what is accepted in the speciﬁc context.
Evidence may be used to show that the generally accepted view is truly acceptable.
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3.4.6. Step four
Although we name this Step 4, it might actually be the ﬁrst step the analyst takes. It refers to the cases where an argument
ﬂaw is evident without having to go through asking the critical questions. These ﬂaws might relate to the following (Hahn,
2011; Glassner & Schwarz, 2007): (a) circularity, in the sense of lack of consideration of different meanings or different
aspects; (b) lack of challenging the relevance of the reasons invoked, which we will refer to as irrelevance; and (c)
misunderstanding, which refers to using the various argumentative units in ways that do not correspond to their functions,
thus revealing that the person has not understood (part of) the task. The following examples describe each one of these cases
of ﬂawed arguments.
Circularity. Two representative examples of insufﬁcient formation of an argument are: begging the question (petitio
principii) and fallacy from repetition (ad nauseam). Regarding “begging the question,” it is usually the case that the reasons
given for a claim are not differentiated from the claim itself, or when the reasons given to further support the main reason
repeat the same thing, what Kuhn (1991) calls “pseudoevidence.” The following example illustrates the second case:
Claim: Employees should not for any reason bring their pets at work.
Reason 1: This will annoy other people.
Reason 2: Pets will disturb people.
Reason 2 does not provide further support to Reason 1, as it is supposed to do. It only paraphrases the content of the main
reason.
As far as repetition is concerned, it is slightly different than begging the question, as the same content is repeated among
units of the “same level” of reasoning. By this, we mean that repetition does not refer to cases where the second unit is
intended to further support the ﬁrst unit in a subordinated manner. We rather focus on those cases in which a new statement
is produced to other justify or rebut the initial claim but it fails to do so as it only repeats the initial contention. Thus,
repetition is other encountered in the relation between Reason 3 and Reason 2, or in the rebuttal as it is related to the main
argument. The following example illustrates the latter:
Claim: There is a high rate of divorce in the U.A.E.
Reason 1: There is no communication between the couple.
Reason 2: They don’t understand each other.
Reason 3: They only believe in what they think.
Objection: Some couples understand each other.
Reason for objection: They know each other before marriage.
Rebuttal: They face problems and they may not understand each other.
Irrelevance. It mostly refers to objections or rebuttals that fail to take into consideration the relevance of the reasons
supporting the initial claim. The example below shows the case of an irrelevant counter-argument:
Claim: Employees should not for any reason bring their pets at work.
Reason 1: You become less efﬁcient.
Reason 2: You are aware of what your pet is doing.
Reason 3: Your colleagues get distracted and they work worse.
Objection: I am still more efﬁcient than my colleagues.
Misunderstanding. Most of the time this ﬂaw corresponds to the fallacy of self-contradiction, especially when the objection
or the reason of the objection supports the same idea as the initial contention. Another case occurs when the rebuttal
supports the same as the objection, instead of further supporting the initial contention, as the example shows:
Claim: Employees should not for any reason bring their pets at work.
Rebuttal: If we leave them at home they will die from loneliness. Moreover, they create a good image for the company.
4. Findings
In total, 1230 (205  6) units of argumentative discourse were codiﬁed using the fallacies or paralogisms described above.
Regarding the coding, a high agreement (94.8%) between two independent coders was achieved, giving a Krippendorff’s
Alpha of approx. 0.8, which is considered satisfying for social sciences. The few discrepancies were all solved through
discussion, rendering the coding a more straightforward process than it initially seems. Of the 1230 units, 213 (17.3%) were
considered as fallacious in one of the following ways (starting from the most frequent): begging the question, repetition,
incoherence, established rule, irrelevance, incompleteness, ad populum, hasty generalization, from consequence, from
ignorance, ad verecundiam, slippery slope, post hoc, and false analogy.
The most common fallacies that emerged are: (a) circular reasoning (either in the form of repetition or begging the
question), and (b) arguments based on some type of “false” authority (established rule or people). As far as the position of the
fallacies is concerned, we observe that undergraduates’ skill to construct good rebuttals is usually ﬂawed by repetitions
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(either of the initial claim or of its reasons) and misunderstanding (students often show that they do not understand the
meaning of rebuttal although it is sufﬁciently explained to them through examples). The other most common type of circular
reasoning, i.e. begging the question, appears more often in the further backing-up efforts, and more precisely in the reason
given to support the objection, and in Reason 2, which often functions subordinately to Reason 1. Finally, arguments from
established rules are used in most of the cases as the primary reason participants come up with to support their claims. For a
complete overview of the ﬁndings of this study, also considering the effect of variables such as culture and area of study on
the quality of arguments emerged, see Rapanta and Walton (2015).
5. Discussion
In the study presented we showed how a simple to use argument-mapping tool can serve as a diagnostic tool regarding
adult students’ argumentation skills when combined with the informal logic method of identifying paraschemes. Our
method is similar to how the CAS system has been used in the ﬁeld of AI and law (Gordon, 2010), but adapted to education
and with a tool familiar to educators. More precisely, we begin with to what the students have provided as input in the
Rationale map boxes with and try to understand with the use of critical questions which scheme they are trying to apply and
in what aspects it becomes a parascheme.
Although argument mapping techniques have been thoroughly used in education (e.g. van Gelder, 2005; Munneke et al.,
2007), their connection with solid theories of informal logic has not been yet achieved. Given the emerging need to assist
students in being able to identify informal reasoning fallacies (e.g. Neuman, 2003; Weinstock et al., 2006), the “marriage”
between the paraschemes theory and a simple mapping task can serve as a thorough and handy assessment method in
education. More precisely, what is new is the method proposed is a combination between the critical questions
corresponding to each argumentation scheme and their application throughout the map-argument. In this way, assessment
decisions made by educators regarding the level of argumentative reasoning of students can be well-structured and
reasoned going through the steps described in Section 3.3. Moreover, adult students may also be assisted in improving their
own reasoning process by adding this element of self-assessment through critical questions after completing a mapargument.
The scope of the paper was theoretical, as we intended to propose a method of assessment based on argument maps.
However, we will also brieﬂy discuss two of our main ﬁndings that can illustrate of the potentialities of the method proposed.
The main weakness observed among the participants was the construction of rebuttals and reasons to support a possible
counter-argument to their own claim. This ﬁnding is in line with other studies pointing out weak rebuttals or lack of
antilogos (Glassner & Schwarz, 2007; Kuhn et al., 2008), i.e. efﬁcient consideration of the other party, as the main ﬂaws of
adolescent and adult reasoning. Our contribution lies on being able to explain why and where these ﬂaws of reasoning
emerge. First, with the help of a structured map, we were able to localize in which component of argumentative reasoning
each weakness emerges more often; for example, begging the question was mostly found among the backing-up reasons of a
counter-argument. Second, with the help of the critical questions accompanying the identiﬁcation of paraschemes, we are
able to make hypotheses regarding the reasons why young adults opt for more heuristic patterns of reasoning in certain
cases; for example, opting for arguments from established rules was the choice of reason supporting their claim for many of
the participants. The fact that the ethnical background did not play any signiﬁcant role in this and other choices, as described
in another study (Rapanta & Walton, 2015) makes us think of the potential universalities that the paraschemes might have.
This aspect will form part of our future work comparing argumentation patterns among different groups of participants.
Finally, one of the study’s limitations that need to be considered is the fact that we were only based on students’
arguments as made explicit in a structured map. It has not been made clear in this paper how the method and ﬁndings can be
applied in dialogical situations, in which the critical questions may/should be asked by a partner as a way of shifting the
burden of proof (Gordon et al., 2007). Nonetheless, the dialogical contextualization permitted by the combination of
paraschemes with the argument mapping task suggests the potential of a model of collaborative learning, such as the ones
already available in the ﬁeld of AI and education (Baker, 2016), that can combine argument mapping with a dialogue
framework. Future research will shed more light to the relationship between informal logic methods, AI tools, and education.
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